The experimental evidence suggests that groups are inefficient at providing threshold public goods. This inefficiency appears to reflect an inability to coordinate over how to distribute the cost of providing the good. So, why do groups not just split the cost equally?
Introduction
A threshold public good is a public good that is provided if and only if contributions reach a certain threshold. The classic example would be a capital fundraising project where, say, $1 million is needed to build a new school, cancer unit or theatre (Andreoni 1998) . The potential applications of the threshold public good concept are, however, far more general than this archetypal example (e.g. Hardin 1982; Taylor and Ward 1982; Hampton 1987 , Van Lange et al. 2013 . For instance, the fixed costs associated with running any charity, or group activity, require a minimum, and often quite large, amount be reached to make the activity viable. It is crucial, therefore, to understand the conditions under which threshold public goods can be efficiently provided.
The provision of threshold public goods does not generate the tension between individual rationality and group outcomes typically associated with public goods (Bagnoli and Lipman 1989) . In particular, there are Nash equilibria where the good is produced at the efficient level. Financing the public good does, however, require people to solve a non-trivial coordination problem, because they must coordinate on how to distribute the cost of providing the public good (Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker 1989) . Experimental evidence suggests that groups are not good at solving this problem; the success rate of providing threshold public goods is typically around 40 to 60 percent, even after experience (Croson and Marks 2000 , Alberti and Cartwright 2015 , Cartwright and Stepanova 2015 . Such low success is inefficient and potentially very costly to the group. 1 This level of inefficiency is intriguing when one takes into account a seemingly obvious solution to the coordination problem, namely, split the cost of providing the good equally (Issac, Schmidtz and Walker 1989) . Speaking generally, we know that groups can coordinate well when there is a focal point that aids coordination (Schelling 1960; Mehta et al. 1994; Bardsley et al. 2010) . For some reason the 'split the cost equally' focal point is not enough, in itself, to help groups coordinate in standard threshold public good games (Issac, Schmidtz and Walker 1989) . This is most powerfully illustrated by (Croson and Marks 2001) who find that recommending the equal split did not increase success rates above 60%. 2 1 Various institutions have been considered that can increase efficiency such as voting (Rauchdobler et al. 2010) , money back guarantee (Cartwright and Stepanova 2015) , and communication (Tavoni et al. 2011 , Krishnamurthy 2001 . But no silver bullet has been found. We discuss the potential role of communication more in the conclusion. 2 In more detail, they found that recommending the equal split had no effect on success rates in a symmetric threshold public good game (see below for a definition of symmetry). It did significantly increase success rates in an asymmetric treatment, but only to the level seen in the symmetric treatments, from 48% to 57%. This raises two fundamental questions: (a) why is the focal point of 'split the cost equally' not sufficient to enable coordination in a standard threshold public good game, and (b) is there any way to encourage groups to successfully coordinate using this focal point.
Answering these two questions is fundamental in understanding the conditions under which threshold public goods can be efficiently provided. In this paper we offer an answer to both questions. In doing so, we also add to the emerging literature on focal points in asymmetric coordination games (Crawford et al. 2008; Isoni et al. 2013 Isoni et al. , 2014 .
In explaining our approach we begin by noting that the standard threshold public good game sees group members make individual contributions towards the public good. All, therefore, an individual decides is her contribution, e.g. 'I will contribute $15'. If interaction is repeated (as it is in standard threshold public good experiments) then an individual's choice can be a signal to others what to contribute (Fatas, Godoy and Ramalingam 2013) , or demonstrate commitment to a pattern of contributions (Sell and Wilson 1991) . This can be viewed as a form of indirect communication. The messages an individual can send, however, are limited to own contribution.
In applications one often observes the potential for more complex strategies. For instance, a group member may say what everyone in the group should do, e.g. 'we should each contribute $15'. This allows a richer form of indirect communication. In addition, a group member may make their contribution conditional on others, e.g. 'I will contribute $15 if and only if everyone else contributes $15'. Such conditional giving changes the rules governing public good provision because agreement is needed. And it is this latter possibility that will be the main focus in this paper. In particular we shall consider a full agreement game that can be briefly described as follows. Each group member specifies a vector of contributions detailing what they and others in the group should contribute. The public good is then provided if and only if every group member states the same vector of contributions (and the sum of individual contributions reach the threshold). Any disagreement amongst group members means the public good is not provided.
We shall demonstrate that the full agreement game has some interesting theoretical properties. We would argue that the game is also of applied interest. To give some context to this, let us consider some applications (which will be discussed more in the conclusion). At one extreme, an individual giving a small donation to charity has little chance to say what others should contribute or make her giving conditional on others. This scenario fits well the standard threshold public good game. At the other extreme consider residents living in an apartment building where unanimity is neccessary in order to progress on some project to change the building. Or, consider decision making in the EU where unanimity is required for a change in policy on, say, the EU budget or common agriculatural policy. These scenarios fit well the full agreement game. The crucial thing is that group members cannot act unilaterally if no agreement is reached. The appartment resident cannot start changing the building without the agreement of others. Similarly, members of the EU cannot change the EU budget without the agreement of others.
Note that the full agreement game pre-supposes some form of instituition that only allows public good provision in the event of agreement. This could be an exogenous institution, such as property right legislation in the case of an apartment building. Or it could be endogenous, as in the case of the EU where state member states have voted to have such an institution. Some institution, though, has to exist. To illustrate the point consider climate change negotiations. Here, countries are not shy in saying what other countries should do. So, we can talk of countries specifying a vector of contributions. It is ultimately, though, up to individual countries (and citizens) how much they contribute to climate change abatement.
Europe, for instance, is free to reduce emissions even if the US will not meet previous commitments like those in the Kyoto Protocol. So, climate change (at least at the moment) is not a full agreement game (Gerber and Wichardt 2009, Cherry and McEvoy 2013) .
The direct consequence of requiring full agreement is to make the group's task more difficult: Group members not only need to be individually willing to contribute enough to finance the good but also need to agree with each other on what they should each contribute.
We will argue, however, that this direct, negative effect can be outweighed by an indirect, positive effects. In particular, the fact that contributions are made conditional on what others do has two basic consequences: (i) it increases the criticality of each individual's decision, while (ii) offering a guarantee that others cannot exploit a willingness to contribute. The prior literature suggests these two consequences will be positive. There is evidence, for instance, that a perception of increased criticality increases contributions (Au, Chen and Morita 1998; De Cremer and van Dijk 2002) and a fear of exploitation discourages contributions (e.g. Isaac et al. 1989; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy 1989) . Consider also Bchir and Willinger (2013) , who find that the requirement to pay a small fee in order to benefit from a threshold public good increases success at providing the good. This effect partly reflects the reduced chance of exploitation that the fee provides.
A need for agreement can only succeed, though, if group members have the means and desire to coordinate. Increased criticality, for example, can only work if group members know what is expected of them. This is much more likely if there is a focal point around which to coordinate. In short, criticality makes every individual feel as though their decision is necessary in order to achieve a successful outcome, while the existence of a focal point makes it possible for the group members to successfully coordinate. As already discussed, however, evidence from the standard threshold public good game does not seem consistent with a strong focal point. Bchir and Willinger (2013) , for instance, found that the introduction of a fee makes a difference by increasing the number of subjects that contribute. It did not increase average contributions or particularly help subjects to coordinate.
3 Will, therefore, group members be able to reach agreement?
To formally analyze the consequences of requiring agreement we apply the seminal theory of focal points due to Sugden (1995) . In the theory, a focal point is captured by the concept of a collectively rational recommendation (CRR). The key thing to note at this stage is that CRR is a signficant strengthening on Nash equilibrium. Specifically, if a group member deviates from the CRR then all players (not just the deviating player) become worse off. If a CRR exists then it is unique, but in most games one does not exist. Our main theoretical result can be summarized as follows: (i) in a standard threshold public good game there is no CRR, but (ii) if full agreement is required to provide the public good there is a unique CRR, namely, to split the cost equally. This result explains why members find it difficult to finance the public good in a standard threshold public good game. It also suggests that a requirement for full agreement will help groups coordinate and successfully finance the good, because it increases the prominence of the equal split focal point.
We test experimentally the hypothesis that a need for agreement increases efficiency in providing the public good and find support for it. At this point we remind that a need for agreement inevitably brings with it a richer means of indirect communication because group members specify a vector of contributions. Our experimental design allows us to distinguish whether the opportunity to specify a vector of contributions or the need for agreement is more important in aiding coordination, and we come down strongly on the side of the need for agreement. Indeed, the requirement to specify a vector of contributions appears to make no difference to success in providing the public good. By contrast, a need for agreement increases success, provided subjects are sufficiently experienced. The finding that people can successfully coordinate when they need to reach agreement is consistent with the evidence that people can coordinate in 'matching games' because of team reasoning or collective rationality (Schelling 1960; Sugden 1993; Mehta et al. 1994; Bacharach 2006 , Bardsely et al. 2010 .
Recall that the need for agreement has two indirect benefits. The discussion so far has focussed on the benefit of increased criticality. Let us look in more detail at the benefit of avoiding exploitation. A need for full agreement gives each group member veto power over how the public good will be financed. Thus, a member cannot be 'unexpectedly' exploited by others. This may give increased confidence to contribute by solving the assurance problem (Issac et al. 1989; Bchir and Willinger 2013) . It does not, however, completely rule out 'exploitation'. In particular, if endowments are asymmetric then the equal split focal point is commonly seen as unfair (see Wilke 1993, 1995) . Given that all members contribute the same to the public good one can think of those with a high endowment as exploiting those with a low endowment. This creates a tension between the focal point and fairness, or between efficiency and fairness. Indeed, those with a relatively low endowment may shun the equal split focal point. The notion that 'unfair' focal points can create a tension in games with asymmetric outcomes is not new (Schelling 1960) . Relatively few experimental studies, however, have looked at behaviour in asymmetric coordination games. 4 To explore the tension between focal points and fairness in more detail we compare a setting with symmetric endowments to settings with progressively more asymmetric endowments. In the case where full agreement is required, we find that increasing asymmetry has no effect on success of providing the public good. This suggests that subjects were willing to trade efficiency for equity. Isoni et al. (2013) obtain a similar result when looking at tacit bargaining games. 5 This apparent willingness of subjects to trade equity for efficiency demonstrates the power of focal points.
We proceed as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the threshold public good games we shall study. In Section 3 we provide our main theoretical results. In Section 4 we describe our experimental design and in Section 5 we provide the results. In Section 6 we conclude and relate our results to the recent literature on climate treaties (see, in particular, Barrett 2013 , Barrett and Dannenberg 2012 , Tavoni et al. 2011 ).
4 Crawford, Gneezy and Rottenstreich (2008) find that slight asymmetry reduces the power of focal points. Other studies, however, paint a more positive picture. For example, Cooper et al. (1993) and Holm (2000) find that a focal point can help players coordinate in the battle of the sexes game. 5 In the battle of the sexes game all efficient equilibrium are asymmetric and so focal points may merely aid coordination. In a threshold public good game and bargaining game there can be a focal asymmetric equilibrium (e.g. split the cost equally) and a less focal symmetric equilibrium (e.g. split the cost proportionally). This creates a tension between the focal point and fairness.
Threshold public good games
We begin by describing what we shall call the standard type of game. The prior literature has focussed on this type of game when considering simultaneous threshold public good games (e.g. Suleiman and Rapoport 1992, Cadsby et al. 2008) . The standard type of game will then be contrasted with three other types of game that progressively differ in the feedback given to players, strategy set, and the payoff function. The differences are summarized in Table 1 and will be explained in more detail below.
In all the games we shall consider there is a set of n players . Each player is endowed with units of a private good where is some positive integer. If for all then we say the game is symmetric. Otherwise we say that it is asymmetric.
There also exist positive integers and that we shall refer to respectively as the threshold and the individual value of the public good. The importance of and will become clear shortly. To clarify terminology, a particular game is characterized by two things, the type of game -standard, full agreement etc. -and the set of parameters of the game -n, E, T and V.
In a standard game, independently and simultaneously all players must decide how much of their endowment to contribute towards a public good. The strategy set, therefore, of any player is the set of integers . A strategy profile details the strategy of each player, where will be called the contribution of player . Let denote total contributions. If total contributions equal or exceed the threshold T then each player receives an additional units of the private good. We also say that the group was successful in providing the public good. If contributions are below the threshold each contribution is refunded. The payoff of player i, given strategy profile , is, therefore, if otherwise
At the end of the game each player is told total contributions, , but is not told the individual breakdown of contributions. In a standard game with feedback players are informed at the end of the game on the list of individual contributions , but all other details remain the same. The difference between a standard game and standard game with feedback was considered by Croson and Marks (1998) .
In a vector game with feedback the strategy set of a player differs to that of a standard game or standard game with feedback. Independently and simultaneously all players must decide on a vector of contributions saying how much they 'suggest' each player should contribute towards the public good. The strategy set of any player is, therefore, . Formally, given strategy profile , the payoff of player i is if and otherwise At the end of the game players are informed on the vector of contributions suggested by each player, and total contributions, as in a vector game. As discussed in the introduction a full agreement game requires some institution that does not allow public good provision in the event there is not full agreement.
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
We finish this section by introducing some notation and assumptions that will prove useful in the remainder of the paper. Let min and let . Informally, we can think of as the maximum that player can or will be willing to contribute, and as the maximum that all players can or will be willing to contribute. We shall use and to denote, respectively, the amount that could be and are contributed by players other than . Finally, we shall assume throughout the following that and for all . Thus, it is socially efficient to provide the public good, and players can, if they choose, split the cost of providing the public good equally.
Nash equilibria, and focal points
Given that it is socially efficient to provide the public good it is clearly crucial that players collectively contribute the threshold amount, , or more. Typically, however, there will be many ways to distribute the cost amongst players. This leads to a non-trivial coordination problem with conflict of interest. We begin this section by briefly illustrating how this problem is encapsulated in a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. We then look at whether the existence of a focal point can help players 'resolve the problem' by coordinating on one of the equilibria.
Nash equilibria
Consider, first, a standard game, and standard game with feedback. In these games, strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all .
7
We say the Nash equilibrium is strict if for all . One can easily derive that strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium with public good provision if and only if and for all
The payoff of player is . Any, ceteris paribus, change in player 's strategy would strictly lower her payoff, either to if she decreases her contribution or to if she increases her contribution to .
The assumption that guarantees the existence of several Nash equilibria with public good provision. 8 To illustrate, we refer to Table 2 which introduces three sets of parameters that will be important in the rest of the paper. Strategy profiles and are two, of many, Nash equilibria that exist with these parameters.
Clearly, the first of these equilibria is preferred by player 2, and the second preferred by player 1. More generally, individual preferences over the set of Nash equilibria will inevitably differ 7 Where denotes the payoff of player if she contributes and the contributions of others are denoted . 8 There may exist Nash equilibria with no public good provision, but given that every perfect Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with public good provision (Bagnoli and Lipman 1989) , we shall not dwell on this possibility. At least one such equilibria will exist if for all . In this case, player receives payoff and no, ceteris paribus, change in her strategy would change her payoff. amongst the group. Hence, there is a conflict of interest between players on how to coordinate and split the cost of the public good (Isaac et al. 1989; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy 1989 Clearly, this adds the additional requirement that all players should agree. Table 2 details the number of Nash equilibria with public good provision in a standard or full agreement game for each set of parameters. Clearly, the number of equilibria is very large. 'Standard' equilibrium refinements do nothing to reduce this number. So, if the problem players' face is to coordinate on a unique Nash equilibrium then they clearly have a potentially tough problem (Isaac et al. 1989, Asch, Gigliotti and Polito 1993) . The experimental evidence with regards to the standard type of game confirms this. While groups successfully provide the public good up to 60 percent of the time (Croson and Marks 2000) , it is rare to observe a Nash equilibrium. Perhaps more importantly, groups that do play a Nash equilibrium in one round (of repeated interaction) appear no more likely to play a Nash equilibrium in future rounds (Cadsby and Maynes 1999) . This likely reflects the desire of at least one player to transition towards a 'better for them' Nash equilibrium. Coordinating on a Nash equilibrium, therefore, is like looking for a needle in a haystack, with the temptation to throw the needle away when you find it in hope of finding a better one. No wonder we observe inefficiency in providing the public good. Or, is there a trick to solving this problem?
Focal points
We know in general that the existence of a focal point is one means by which players can coordinate on a Nash equilibrium (Schelling 1960) . It has been suggested that a threshold public good game has a natural focal point, namely to split the cost of providing the public good equally (e.g. Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker 1989; Suleiman and Rapoport 1992 ; see also Holmström and Nalebuff 1992) . We know, however, that split the cost equally is not a good description of how players behave in the standard type of game (e.g. Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker 1989; Suleiman and Rapoport 1992; Marks and Croson 1999; Croson and Marks 2001; Coats et al. 2009 ). That leaves the puzzle and challenge discussed in the introduction: why is split the cost not 'focal enough', and is there any way to make it 'more focal'?
To answer these questions it is natural to apply a theory of focal points. In this paper we shall apply the seminal theory of focal points due to Sugden (1995) . The theory uses a principle of collective rationality. 10 The basic idea behind collective rationality, or team reasoning, is that a player will recognize a common interest in trying to coordinate on some equilibrium (Sugden 1993; Bacharach 1999) . Thus, players look for a decision rule that if followed by all is most likely to produce successful coordination; 'less ambiguous' and 'more obvious' rules should tend to be favoured (Schelling 1960) . In order to apply the theory imagine someone giving advice to each player on how much to contribute, or what vector of contributions to suggest. The advice should consist of a decision rule that can be interpreted as a comprehensive plan to play the game (we shall have more to say on this shortly). A recommendation details a decision rule for every player .
A recommendation is said to be collectively rational (CRR) if there exist payoffs such that (i) if every player follows her advice then expected payoffs are given by , and (ii) if some player does not follow her advice then, whatever the decision rule of the other players, the expected payoff of any player is strictly less than . 11 The definition of CRR is stronger than that of Nash (or correlated) equilibrium in two important respects: it requires that any deviation from the recommendation results in all players getting a lower payoff irrespective of whether others follow their recommendation.
This is a tough condition to satisfy. Tough enough that, in general, there can be at most one collectively rational recommendation and in many games there will be none. Sugden (1995) convincingly argues that if a CRR exists then each player should act on that recommendation.
A CRR is thus akin to a focal point of the game.
In a standard game (or standard game with feedback) one can think of a decision rule as a contribution or set of contributions. Thus, , and player is advised to randomly choose a contribution from set . For example, the advice might be 'contribute 25', , or 'contribute something between 25 and 35', . Analogously, in a vector game or a game with full agreement one can think of a decision rule as a vector of contributions or set of vector of contributions. Thus, , and player is advised to randomly choose a vector of contributions from set . For example, the advice might be 'split the cost equally'
or 'contribute zero and split the cost amongst others', which if gives Crucial, at this point, is to explain the information players have about the labels in the game. We can contrast the opposite extremes of common knowledge and a scrambled labelling procedure (Crawford and Haller 1990; Sugden 1995) . In either case it is assumed that every player knows the parameters of the game, . What may or may not be known are player labels. With common knowledge every player knows which player is 'player 1' with endowment , and knows that everyone knows that etc. With a scrambled labelling procedure every player knows that there is a 'player 1' with endowment but they don't know who that player is. This distinction is most easily explained with an example. Consider the advice 'player contributes zero and split the cost amongst others'. In the case of common knowledge this equates to
With a scrambled labelling procedure it is ambiguous who player is. The advice is, thus, more appropriately read as 'let someone else contribute zero and split the cost amongst the rest of us'. This advice, therefore, if , equates to
The crucial point to recognise is that the scrambling of labels constrains how specific advice can be. The advice 'let someone else contribute zero ....' is ambiguous because there are potential candidates for the 'someone else'.
In order to formalize terms in the context of a standard game we say that strategy profile is an -permutation of strategy profile if there exists a one-to-one mapping such that for all and . In short, the contribution of player remains the same while the contributions of all others are potentially swapped around.
We say that there is a scrambled labelling procedure if any permissible decision rule satisfies the following condition: if and is an -permutation of then . We say that there is not a scrambled labelling procedure if any decision rule is permissible. This definition naturally extends to a vector game and full agreement game.
We can now state our main theoretical result. This shows that there exists a collectively rational recommendation if and only if (i) full agreement is required, (ii) labels are scrambled, and (iii) the number of players is sufficiently large. The CRR is to split the cost equally.
Intuitively, this is because split the cost equally is unambiguous while all other advice is ambiguous. Recall that collective rationality will favour decision rules that are less ambiguous.
Theorem 1: There exists a collectively rational recommendation if and only if the game is of the full agreement type, there is scrambled labelling, and
When it exists, the collectively rational recommendation is to split the cost equally, We turn now to a full agreement game in which labels are not scrambled. Consider a CRR . Again, we can assume that consists of a single vector of contributions . Let denote the set of strict Nash equilibria with public good provision. We know that contains at least two equilibria. Moreover, because there is not a scrambled labelling procedure any strategy profile is a permissible decision rule. The argument used for a standard game can now be used again to obtain a contradiction.
Finally, consider a full agreement game with scrambled labelling. Also, consider the recommendation to split the cost equally. If players follow this recommendation then they will play a strict Nash equilibrium with public good provision. Payoffs will be given by for all . We need to rule out the possibility that a player could expect to do better than this. Without loss of generality we shall attempt to increase the payoff of player 1.
To do so, we need that player 1 contributes some amount and that the public good is provided. The least ambiguous way for others to provide the public good is to split the remaining cost equally. Suppose, therefore, that player 1 uses decision rule
The scrambled labelling procedure means that player 2 can only possible agree with player 1 if she uses the decision rule
The same applies for all . The probability of full agreement is given by the probability that every player randomly selects player 1 to contribute amount . The probability player selects player 1 is given by . The probability that every player randomly selects player 1 is, therefore, . A scrambling of labels encapsulates two things, that player identity is private information and that endowment is private information. It seems very natural that player identity be private information; for instance, if players agree on the decision rule 'someone contribute zero and split the cost amongst others' it seems unlikely they would all independently know who the 'someone else' should be. This, in itself, is enough to argue that scrambled labelling is the appropriate thing to consider in symmetric games. In asymmetric games, however, the issue of common knowledge warrants more consideration. To illustrate Table 3 gives some decision rules that are conditional on player endowments. 13 Decision rules 'split the cost proportionally' and 'split the cost so payoffs are fair' are intuitive Wilke 1993, 1995) . They are, however, only possible if player endowments are common 12 The only empirical results we are aware of looking at similar issues are due Van de Kragt, Orbell and Dawes (1983) and Bornstein (1992) . In a binary threshold public good game they find that subjects who have agreed with fellow group members how to finance the public good stuck to the agreement. This, however, gives little insight on how group members can successfully reach agreement, particularly in continuous threshold public good games where the task is considerably more difficult. For example, Rauchdobler, Sausgruber and Tyran (2010) find that voting on the size of threshold before playing a threshold public good game makes no difference to efficiency. 13 See Table 2 for details on the parameters of the symmetric, asymmetric and very asymmetric games.
knowledge. A scrambled labelling procedure, by making player endowments private information, rules them out.
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
If recommendations such as 'split the cost proportionally' are permissible then there is no CRR in an asymmetric full agreement game. 14 The intuition for this being that there is no sense in which, say, the equal split is any less ambiguous than the proportional split, according to the definition of a CRR. Note, however, that even if player endowments are common knowledge, some players have an 'incentive' to ignore this information in the hope of coordinating on split the cost equally. An expectation that information about endowments may be ignored by at least one player is enough to break common knowledge and make it 'as if' labels are scrambled. One could argue, therefore, that the equal split is focal in a full agreement game even if labels are procedurally not scrambled.
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We finish this section by noting how the above argument, and the whole analysis of this paper, depends critically on the 'framing' of the contribution decision. In the games we are considering here group members choose how much of their endowment to contribute. This is the standard framing in the public goods literature. Consider, however, an alternative framing in which group members choose what proportion of their endowment to contribute. Theorem 1 can easily be revised to show that the proportional split is now the CRR in the full agreement game. The framing of the contribution decision clearly, therefore, can make a big difference.
Experimental Design
We initially considered four treatments, with each of the four types of game presented in Table   1 corresponding to a treatment. Following the advice of a referee we subsequently considered a further two treatments with variations on the vector and full-agreement game (more details to follow shortly). We reiterate that our standard treatment corresponds to the benchmark 14 I equally. 15 This more liberal interpretation of label scrambling would make no difference in a standard game or vector game.
treatment used in the threshold public goods literature. The game used in the standard treatment with feedback, vector treatments, and full agreement treatments differ as detailed in Section 2.
Each experimental session was divided into three parts, as summarised in Table 4 . In part 1, subjects played a game with parameters corresponding to those in the symmetric game, as already detailed in Table 2 , for 10 rounds. In part 2 they played a game with parameters corresponding to those in the asymmetric game for a further 10 rounds, and in part 3 they played a game with parameters corresponding to those in the very asymmetric game for a final 10 rounds. The type of game played, standard, standard with feedback, vector or full agreement, was the same in all three parts of a session. Note that subjects retained their role within the group throughout a part. Thus, a subject endowed with, say, 70 in an asymmetric game was endowed with 70 in all 10 rounds.
The groups, of five, were randomly assigned at the beginning of each part but remained fixed during the part. Fixed matching during each part of the session allows us to look for dynamic and learning effects as observed in previous threshold public good experiments (e.g. Cadsby et al. 2008) . Indeed, given our interpretation of the vector of contributions as a form of indirect communication it is natural to think of the 10 rounds within each part as part of one big game. With this interpretation the final round of the ten takes on special importance as culmination of the game. In this last round there is nothing to be gained by indirect communication and so the only relevant objective is to maximize round payoff.
The use of three different sets of parameters allows us to consider symmetric and asymmetric games. 16 More specifically, the use of the benchmark parameters in part 1 allows an unambiguous comparison of behaviour across treatments in the standard, symmetric case considered in the literature. Parts 2 and 3 allow us to compare behaviour across treatments as subjects are exposed to progressively more asymmetric endowments. Of primary interest is whether groups coordinate on the equal split even though this becomes increasingly inequitable.
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 16 The random matching between parts potentially allows us to treat the success of groups in one part as independent from the success of groups in other parts. We shall not push this claim too far, as it is natural to imagine some learning effects over the 30 rounds. Note, however, that both the group and game change in each part and so a claim of independence is not too extreme. The data analysis will control for part.
In relating our experiment design to Theorem 1 we remind that Theorem 1 points to three important factors -the type of game, number of players, and label scrambling. Our focus in this experiment is primarily to compare different types of game, and in particular to compare a vector game to a full agreement game. Such focus reflects our belief that the type of game is the most interesting and important factor to consider. In order to focus on the type of game the number of players and scrambling of labels should be fixed throughout. In terms of the number of players, we note that condition (2) is satisfied for all the parameters we consider. In terms of label scrambling, more detailed comment is needed.
The vector and full agreements treatments were designed in a way that player identity was scrambled but endowment was not. So, players in the asymmetric games could have agreed to condition contribution on endowment. Theoretically, therefore, Theorem 1 directly applies to the symmetric game but not the asymmetric games. The instructions given to subjects made, however, no explicit mention of player labelling or how the game would appear to other members of the group. 17 (The instructions are available in online supplementary material.) In line with the reasoning at the end of the previous section we suggest this will likely make it 'as if' labels were scrambled.
Following the comments of a referee we ran two further treatments, labelled vector-S and full agreement-S, in which both player identity and endowment were scrambled.
Specifically, subjects were told only own endowment and the distribution of endowments. This did not change the instructions but did make it virtually impossible to condition suggested contribution on endowment. 18 This allows us to explore the effects of label scrambling. More generally, our experiment design allows us to directly test Theorem 1 while also exploring the information that groups choose to exploit.
The experiments were run at the University of Kent (in the UK) with subjects recruited from the general university population. The interactions were anonymous and the experiments were computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) . We took care to recruit subjects who had not taken part in similar experiments before. We ran 12 sessions in all giving a total of 215 subjects. Subjects were paid in cash at the end of the session an amount equal to their payoff over the 10 rounds multiplied by one pence for one of the three parts. 
Hypotheses
The standard game has been extensively studied in the previous literature and so we 'know' to expect success rates of around 40-60% (e.g. Croson and Marks 2000) . Our first hypothesis is that success at providing the public good will be similar in the standard game with feedback and vector game. This is a natural assumption given that there are no strategic differences between these three games.
Hypothesis 1:
The success rate of providing the public good is the same in the standard, standard with feedback, and vector and vector-S treatments.
Croson and Marks (1998) compare the standard game and standard game with feedback in a symmetric setting, and find no significant difference in outcomes. 20 We shall extend this by considering asymmetric games and the vector game. Note, however, that Hypothesis 1 is not our main concern and the standard and standard with feedback treatments were primarily included to check consistency of our results with the previous literature.
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Our main hypothesis concerns the comparison between a vector game and full agreement game. On the basis of Theorem 1 we argue that groups may be better at coordinating in the full agreement game because of the collectively rational recommendation to 'split the cost equally'.
Hypothesis 2:
The success rate of providing the public good in a full agreement and full agreement-S treatments will be higher than that in the vector and vector-S treatments. Groups will agree to split the cost equally.
19 At the end of each part subjects were asked to fill in a short questionnaire regarding their general experience in the 10 rounds. At the end of part 3 subjects were asked to fill in a further questionnaire. Subjects were not paid for answering the questionnaires but had to answer all of the questions in order to proceed with the experiment. The analysis of the questionnaire responses is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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feedback treatment corresponds to their individual-identifiable treatment. They also considered a third, individual-anonymous treatment. Significant differences in outcomes were observed between the individualanonymous treatment and the group and individual-identifiable treatments. 21 This is reflected in the relative low number of groups in the standard and standard with feedback treatments. Note, however, that four groups per treatment is not low by the standards of this literature, e.g. Croson and Marks (1998) only consider five groups per treatment.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 together suggest that a requirement of full agreement can increase success rates in threshold public good games. We reiterate that the conditions for providing the public good are much more stringent in a full agreement game than in a vector game. It is far from trivial, therefore, that Hypothesis 2 will hold. It will only hold if all players react to the change in incentives in the way we have predicted.
Our final hypothesis concerns endowment asymmetry. The more asymmetric are endowments the less equitable is split the cost equally. For example in a game with very asymmetric endowments players 1 to 3 get payoff 50 while players 4 and 5 get payoff 125.
This creates a tension between the focal point and fairness. Our null hypothesis is that subjects will sacrifice fairness in order to coordinate.
Hypothesis 3:
The success rate of providing the public good will be the same in a symmetric, asymmetric and very asymmetric full agreement game.
An alternative to Hypothesis 3 would be to say that when endowments are asymmetric or very asymmetric groups will be less successful at providing the public good. This can occur if those with the smallest endowment 'reject' to split the cost equally on fairness grounds. It can also happen, recalling Theorem 1, if subjects try to coordinate on, say, the proportional split or fair split. Hypothesis 3 encapsulates, therefore, the idea that subjects will act 'as if' information on endowments is scrambled. This idea also feeds into Hypotheses 1 and 2 where the vector-S and full agreement-S treatments are treated as synonymous with the vector and full agreement treatments.
Experimental Results
Before we begin analyzing the results let us clarify some issues. We reiterate that our main focus is to compare different types of game and, in particular, to compare the vector and full agreement game. In order to do that we shall compare both: (a) the unscrambled treatments, vector versus full agreement, and (b) the scrambled treatments, vector-S versus full agreement-S. This approach takes into account that the scrambled and unscrambled treatments were run at different times and so there is increased potential for unobserved heterogeneity. If we obtain similar results for both (a) and (b) then our findings appear robust. In an appendix we explore in more detail the role of label scrambling.
Success Rates
We begin the discussion of our experimental results with some aggregate data on success rates and total contributions. Table 5 summarizes the success rate at providing the public good in the first five rounds and last five rounds of each treatment in each part. Table 6 summarizes total contributions. 22 At the overall level, the success rate is similar in the full agreement treatments as the standard and vector treatments. 23 Look a little deeper, however, and differences emerge.
Total contributions are relatively high in the full agreement treatment. There are also some noticeable dynamic differences.
[INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 AROUND HERE] These dynamic differences are clearly apparent in Figure 1 , which plots the success rate at providing the public good over time in the two full agreement treatments and two vector treatments (ignore, for now, the FULL ALL HP data). 24 Broadly speaking, the success rate appears stable or decreasing across the 10 rounds of each part in the vector treatments while it is increasing in the full agreement treatments. Indeed, in the first round of the full agreement treatments the success rate is always near zero, but by the end of the ten rounds, the success rate reaches 56 percent in part 1 and a relatively high 67 percent in part 2 and 73 percent in part 3. It is also noteworthy that the success rate is increasing across the three parts in the two full agreement treatments (see Table 5 ). This contrasts with a decreasing success rate in the vector treatment (but not vector-S treatment).
[
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
To more formally test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we report results of random-effects probit regressions with the probability of success as the dependent variable. The vector treatment was used as comparator for the unscrambled regressions and the vector-S treatment for the scrambled regressions. This directly allows us to test whether success was higher in the full agreement treatments than in the vector treatments (Hypothesis 2) and whether success was the 22 Notice that, in all four treatments, total contributions are obtained by adding up own contributions even if the public good is not provided. 23 The average success rates and average contributions in the standard treatment are consistent with those observed in earlier studies (e.g. Cadsby et al. 2008) . 24 Given that scrambling makes little difference we provide aggregated data. The standard treatments are omitted to avoid clutter.
same in the vector treatment as in the standard treatments (Hypothesis 1). The results are reported in Table 7 .
[INSERT Consider now the scrambled regressions reported in Table 7 . Here the evidence is less strong, but that is not unexpected given the smaller number of observations. The main thing to note is that we again see a clear dynamic difference between the full agreement-S and vector-S treatments. As before, the success rate is increasing in the full agreement-S treatment.
Moreover, the coefficients on FULL and FULL_Round are consistent across the scrambled and unscrambled regressions.
To test whether the success rate was stable across the three parts in the full agreement treatments (Hypothesis 3), we report the results of a random-effects probit regression with a dummy for each part except part 1 (used as a comparator). To account for possible dynamic effects, we also include interaction variables of round crossed with part, as well as a dummy for last round success (which can be ignored for the moment). Table 8 reports the results. In the full agreement treatments we see no evidence of a difference between parts 2 and 1 and 25 To claim that success rate is increasing in the full agreement treatment in part 1, we need to take account of the negative Round coefficient. Doing so we still find a highly significant effect (Wald test, p < 0.001). 26 To illustrate, consider the 5% confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities of success in the last round. For the full agreement treatment the lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval were, respectively, 0.77 and 0.995. For the vector treatment the lower and upper bounds were, respectively, 0.043 and 0.491.
only weak evidence of a difference between parts 3 and 1. We also tested for a difference between parts 2 and 3 and did not find one (for the average, p > 0.25 and round, p > 0.45).
For comparison, Table 8 reports analogous results using the vector and standard treatments (other) and vector-S treatment. In the 'other' treatments we observe significantly lower success rates in parts 2 and 3 compared to part 1. That we should observe a lower success rate with asymmetric endowments is consistent with prior results (Croson and Marks 2001) .
The main thing we would highlight about this finding, is that it suggests the consistency of our results with Hypothesis 3 is not solely due to an order effect. In particular, if the sole reason groups maintain a consistent success rate across parts in the full agreement treatment is due to experience and learning then we would expect to see something similar in the other treatments, and we do not.
The data we have reviewed so far is consistent with Hypothesis 1 in that there is no strong evidence of any significant difference between the two standard treatments and the vector treatments. It is also consistent with Hypothesis 3 in that there is no evidence of a difference in success in the full agreement treatments because of asymmetry. Evaluating
Hypothesis 2 is a little trickier. One might have hoped that groups would be able to successfully coordinate in round 1 of the full agreement treatments. Clearly, that did not happen. With experience, however, success rates in the full agreement treatments were high, and significantly higher than in the vector treatments. This provides some support for Hypothesis 2. But, it also suggests we need to look a little bit deeper at how groups were able to learn to successfully provide the public good.
Coordinating over time
As well as giving the actual success rates in the full agreement and vector treatments, Figure 1 shows the success rate that would have been achieved in the full agreement treatments if the rules for the provision of the public good had been the same as in the vector treatment (the FULL ALL HP line). Observe that success rates would have been very high. This tells us that very different things are causing inefficiency in the full agreement treatments compared to the vector treatments. In the vector treatments we know that any failure to provide the public good must be caused by the total contribution being insufficient. In the full agreement treatments it is clear that failure to provide the public good was primarily caused by a lack of agreement, and not the total contribution being insufficient. This allows us to reconcile the high contributions we observe in the full agreement treatment (see Table 6 ) with the not so high success rate (see Table 5 ). Figure 1 suggests that increasing success in the full agreement treatments reflects groups learning how to coordinate. One way to capture this learning effect is to look at whether group success is permanent or temporary. We know from the previous literature that success in the standard treatment tends to be temporary, i.e. success in one period is no guarantee of success in subsequent periods (Alberti, Cartwright and Stepanova 2013) . If groups in the full agreement treatments are learning how to coordinate then we would expect success to be more permanent, i.e. once the group finds how to coordinate they will stick with it. Such a difference between the full agreement and vector treatments would be consistent with Theorem 1 and the notion of collective rationality, provided that groups learn to coordinate on split the cost equally.
We find strong evidence that group success is more permanent in the full agreement treatments. For instance, in the full agreement treatments, 27 out of the 52 groups successfully provide the public good in every round after their first success; this meant sustaining success for an average of 6.0 out of ten rounds. 27 In the vector treatments, only 6 out of the 51 groups sustained successful provision; they did so for an average 5.3 rounds. This difference is significant for both the unscrambled (LR, p < 0.001) and scrambled treatments (p = 0.06). Also, in the full agreement treatments, initial success was maintained for an average of 4.7 rounds compared to only 3.2 rounds in the vector treatments. This difference is again significant for both the unscrambled (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.05) and scrambled treatments (p = 0.02).
28
To provide some additional evidence we can return to Table 8 and the success(-1) coefficients. Success(-1) is a dummy variable that takes value one if the public good was successful provided in the previous round. In the full agreement treatments we see that success in the previous round is a strong predictor of success in the current round. We also obtain a similar effect in the full agreement and full agreement-S treatments. In the other treatments, consistent with the previous literature, we see that in the symmetric game success in the previous round is not a predictor of success in the current round. In the asymmetric treatments success is more permanent, but still considerably less permanent than in the full agreement treatments.
27 For simplicity we have aggregated over both treatments and all parts given no observed differences. For example, the numbers for the full agreement treatment are 19 out of 36 groups and for the full agreement-S treatment 8 out of 16. Similar, the numbers are 7 out of 18 in part 1, 11 in part 2 and 9 in part 3. 28 This holds despite the data for the full agreement treatments being highly censored by the ten round cut off We have no idea how long the 27 groups who successfully sustained provision up to period 10 could have continued to maintain their success.
At this point it is interesting to mention again the findings of Bchir and Willinger (2013) . Recall, that in studying symmetric threshold public good games they find that a requirement to pay a small fee in order to benefit from a public good increases efficiency in providing the good. 29 The fee worked by increasing the number of subjects that contribute, rather than enabling better coordination. This leads to important dynamic differences, relative to our findings. In particular, the fee leads to an immediate increase in success but significant inefficiency remains over time. By contrast, we have seen that the need for agreement, decreases initial success but with sufficient experience results in high efficiency. These differences reflect how the need for agreement is a 'stronger' intervention than that of a small fee. This is formally captured by Theorem 1, once we note that the introduction of a fee still leaves no collective rational recommendation.
It remains to question whether groups coordinated on the CRR of split the cost equally.
Figure 2 details individual choices in round 10 of each part. 30 We distinguish choices into three categories: split the cost equally, symmetric but inefficient choice, e.g. vector of contributions , and any non-symmetric choice. In the full agreement treatment the vast majority of choices are symmetric, and the majority of these choices are split the cost equally.
Interestingly, however, groups did successfully coordinate on alternatives to split the cost equally. For example, in part 1 we saw groups coordinate on and ; in part 2 we saw groups coordinate on and ; in part 3 we saw one group coordinate on .
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]
The predominance of split the cost equally in the full agreement treatments is consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 3. Indeed, when endowments were very asymmetric, all bar one of the groups that successfully coordinated used split the cost equally. We know that split the cost equally is typically considered unfair Wilke 1993, 1995) . Indeed, it shows up in a preference for the proportional split in the vector treatment (as observed in other studies, e.g. 29 The threshold public good game considered is different to that considered in this paper in that there was no refund and there was a rebate (in the form of increased public good provision). 30 We have again aggregated together the full agreement treatments and vector treatments given that the picture is similar in both cases. 31 We can only speculate on why groups would coordinate on a symmetric but inefficient outcome like A S in the first round leaves room for manoeuvre but can then become a focal point for agreement.
sacrifice equity in order to coordinate on the focal point. As discussed in the introduction this finding is consistent with recent results by Isoni et al. (2013) and points to the power of focal points in asymmetric games. The support we find for Hypothesis 3 is also consistent with the idea that players behave 'as if' information about endowments is scrambled. Some groups did use information about endowments and successfully coordinate on outcomes similar to the proportional or fair split, but the vast majority did not.
Conclusions
Many public goods can be implemented as threshold public goods and so it is very important to question whether such goods can be provided efficiently. The experimental evidence to date suggests that inefficiency is to be expected. In this paper we offer an explanation for this inefficiency and a potential solution by applying a model of focal points due to Sugden (1995) .
To explain the inefficiency we show that in a standard threshold public good game there is no collectively rational recommendation (CRR). This means that there is no 'easy way' for group members to agree on how to split the cost of providing the public good. In offering a solution we show that if full agreement is required to provide the public good then there is a CRR. That recommendation is to split the cost equally.
The need for full agreement encapsulates two things: the chance to specify what others should contribute and a requirement for unanimity. Together these allow each group member to say 'I will contribute if and only if ...'. The strict definition of full agreement that we considered is clearly somewhat stylized. The basic notion, however, that group members can, and would want to make contributions conditional on what others are doing seems very natural.
It is encapsulated, for instance, in the matched funding schemes that are commonly used for capital fundraising projects. Less natural is the notion that a strict requirement of full agreement would 'help' groups coordinate. After all, the direct effect of requiring full agreement is to make it more difficult for the group to provide the public good; all group members need to agree. It is, thus, an empirical question whether a requirement of full agreement is a help or hindrance for groups.
We reported experimental results to explore this question. These results show that when group members first interacted, the requirement for full agreement led to significantly decreased efficiency; this reflects the difficulty of all members reaching agreement. With experience, however, efficiency increased and increased to relatively high levels. Our results clearly demonstrate that a requirement for full agreement need not be 'too tough'. Indeed, of the 54 groups in the full agreement treatments only 9 failed to provide the public good at least once. This compares to 4 out of 51 in the vector treatments. Our results also suggest the requirement for full agreement increased criticality as predicted. In particular, success proved relatively permanent when full agreement was required.
Our theoretical and experimental results provide evidence that a requirement for full agreement can increase efficiency. The indirect benefit of increased criticality can overcome the direct cost of requiring agreement. We believe that this finding could be usefully extended to applied settings. As an informal illustration let us contrast EU decision making and climate change negotiations.
A strict notion of agreement, including unanimity, is central to EU decision making.
Whether it be the EU budget, trade negotiations with the US, the bailout of Greece, sanctions against Russia, fishing quotas in the Atlantic, or the Syrian refugee crises, full agreement (a few caveats aside) is needed before action can take place. This strictness is often criticized as a potential cause of bottleneck. Many would argue, however, that the EU has been surprisingly successful in achieving its objectives.
32 So, the need for full agreement may be an advantage and not a problem. Note that the EU could change its rules to allow unilateral action. The requirement for full agreement is, therefore, endogenous. Interestingly, rapid EU enlargement has done little to shake the requirement for full agreement on many policy issues.
Contrast EU decision making with climate change negotiations. These negotiations take place without the need for full agreement, as we have defined it (see also McEvoy 2010). In particular, the various international treaties that have been signed leave the onus on individual countries to reduce emissions. In other words, countries are free to act unilaterally. This, we would argue, is a key reason for the lack of progress on climate change abatement (see also Gerber and Wichardt 2009, Cherry and McEvoy 2013) . Admittedly, we cannot envisage how an EU style need for agreement could be implemented at the global level. Full agreement is, therefore, unlikely to be the answer. But, at least we gain insight on the problem, namely that environmental treates are not a CRR.
With this in mind let us relate our approach to the recent literature on climate treaties.
Barrett (2013) is representative of this literature in implicitly assuming that a treaty will be self-32 As an interesting anecdotal example of EU decision making, consider the £1.7bn surcharge the UK was required to pay towards the EU budget in 2014. It would be an understatement to say that this surcharge was unpopular within the UK. The real headline grabber, however, was that France and Germany would receive UK F G I not individual contributions that countries need agreement on. And agree they quickly did.
enforcing if it is a Nash equilibrium (Cherry and McEvoy 2013) . Our starting point for this paper was a belief that Nash equilibrium does not appear self enforcing in threshold public good games. As we have discussed above, and will discuss more below, in the experimental lab we repeatedly observe groups deviating from Nash equilibrium. This suggests that a stronger equilibrium concept is needed and we argue that the collectively rational recommendation fits the bill. With this interpretation a treaty would be self-enforcing if and only if it is a CRR. Put differently, a treaty may unravel if it is not a CRR.
In motivating this point suppose (as considered by Tavoni et al. 2011 , Barrett and Dannenberg 2012 ) that group members are allowed to make a public pledge of how much they plan to contribute before actually contributing. Moreover, suppose the pledges equate to a Nash equilibrium. If one person deviates from their pledge then there is no reason for others to stick to their pledges (Dawes, van de Kragt and Orbell 1988 , Chen and Komorita 1994 , Tavoni et al. 2011 . Indeed, the mere belief that at least one person will deviate from a pledge may be enough for others to ignore theirs (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1991) . Note that this incentive to deviate follows because the Nash equilibrium is not a CRR. The results of Tavoni et al.
(2011) and Barrett and Dannenberg (2012, 2014) show that many subjects do indeed deviate from pledges. More evidence on the instability of Nash equilibria in threshold public good games is provided by McEvoy et al. (2011) and Croson and Marks (2001) . McEvoy et al. (2011) found that around 30% of subjects deviated from a commitment to contribute to public good provision even though this meant they could incur a fine for doing so. Croson and Marks (2001) found that most subjects did not follow a recommended (Nash equilibrium)
contribution. By definition a collectively rational recommendation should be immune to such instability.
We are not, however, arguing that a requirement for full agreement is necessarily the optimal way to go. Full agreement requires an authority that may be difficult to implement.
Also, as group size increases and the benefits of the public good become highly asymmetric we may find situations in which it does not make sense to require all group members agree.
Instead, it may be more appropriate to require some level of agreement below full agreement (Orbell, Dawes and can de Kragt 1990) . Indeed, there may be an optimal level of agreement required in order to trade-off the benefit of increased criticality with the difficulty of getting many to agree. It may also be appropriate to consider rounds of cheap talk before a decision has to be made, and to allow side-payments between players that have highly asymmetric endowments. These are issues that can be explored in future work.
The role of cheap talk seems particularly worthy of more consideration. If there is a focal point then communication is likely to be of limited benefit (Schelling 1960 , Isoni et al. 2014 Isaac and Walker 1988 , Isoni et al. 2011 , Palfrey, Rosenthal, and Roy 2015 . Evidence on this, however, is lacking. While communication has been extensively studied in linear public good games (see Balliet 2010 for a survey), in threshold public good games the evidence is far more limited. In particular, there is no study, as far as we are aware, that considers communication in the standard game considered in the paper. The evidence we do have is also somewhat mixed (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1991 , Ledyard 1995 , see also Chamberlin 1978 . For instance, Feltovich and Grossman (2015) find that the effect communication has on cooperation decreases as group size increases from 2 up to 15.
Appendix: Label scrambling
Given that the scrambled and unscrambled coordination and full agreement treatments were run at different times there is increased potential for unobserved heterogeneity. So, any comparison of scrambled versus unscrambled treatments needs be tentative. Still, in Table A1 we report the results of random effects probit regressions that make use of all the data. This allows some insight on whether scrambling makes a difference. Note that the communication treatment is used as comparator. Also we have used a dummy for a full agreement treatment (scrambled or unscrambled) and a separate dummy for the full agreement-S treatment. This allows a clearer comparison of whether scrambling makes a difference.
The highly significant coefficients on FULL_ALL reaffirm that success starts from a low base but is increasing in the full agreement treatments. These coefficients can be compared to those in Table 7 . Our primary interest here is to see whether scrambling makes a difference.
Somewhat surprisingly we find that scrambling makes a difference in part 1. This is a surprise because scrambling is irrelevant for the symmetric game used in part 1. There is evidence, therefore, that we are picking up unobserved heterogeneity. This is why in the main body of the paper we report the unscrambled and scrambled treatments separately.
If scrambling is going to make a difference then this should come in the asymmetric games played in parts 2 and 3. In part 2 we see no evidence that scrambling makes a difference.
In part 3 there is weak evidence of a higher success rate when labels are scrambled. This is also reflected in the raw numbers reported in Table 5 . We would not, however, want to draw too strong a conclusion from this evidence. Our interpretation of the data is that label scrambling made no difference. This seems an apt point to also mention the results of Marks and Croson (1999) . They compare a setting where endowments are public information to settings where endowments are private information. This limiting of information about endowments is not too dissimilar to label scrambling and Marks and Croson find it has no effect on success rates or group contributions. 
